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Note
Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret
Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide
by
JULIA PUGLIESE*
It hath often been said that it is not death but dying that is terrible.1
Introduction
Initially, Dr. Ethan Green2 was opposed to assisted suicide.3 How-
ever, he was forced to reevaluate his position when a patient with AIDS,
Michael Ellis, asked him for help in ending his life. Dr. Green thought
he would be able to dissuade Michael by suggesting an aggressive pain
treatment plan. After consultation the patient refused to accept the
treatment option. Michael wanted to die.
Dr. Green agonized over whether he should help Michael. He ini-
tially told Michael that he needed to know more about him and his views
and about the situation before he could make a decision to help. Dr.
Green learned that Michael had "had AIDS for five years,... nursed his
lover through the end stages of AIDS, and ... talked about his own
plans for assisted suicide with friends."' 4 Dr. Green then consulted with
a psychiatrist who "reported that the patient was not depressed, but
steady and rational."'5 A little more than a month later, after much
thought, Dr. Green decided to help.
The next step was to plan a method by which to conduct the assisted
suicide. Although Dr. Green did consult with a doctor whom he trusted,
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1991, University of California, Los Angeles. I
would like to thank my family and Thomas Alloggiamento for their patience and support
during the writing of this Note. I would also like to thank everyone who participated in its
editing and production.
1. HENRY FIELDING, AMELIA, vol. I, at 108 (Dutton 1962) (1752).
2. The names of the doctor and the patient have been changed.
3. Dick Lehr, More Learn of a Practice Long Hidden, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 26, 1993, at
1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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he was generally uncomfortable discussing assisted suicide with col-
leagues. Instead, he turned to books. Based on much research, Dr.
Green devised a plan by which Michael would take an overdose of medi-
cation. Dr. Green wrote the patient a prescription for a month's supply
of barbiturates. One week later he wrote a prescription for a potent nar-
cotic elixir for pain. Two days after receiving the second prescription,
Michael decided the time had come to effectuate his decision.
Michael called Dr. Green to his home. Several of Michael's friends
were there to say their final goodbyes. Michael said goodbye to Dr.
Green and thanked him. He then took all of the pills and drank the
narcotic. Michael lied down and Dr. Green stepped out of the room.
When Dr. Green returned, Michael was dead.
Dr. Green remained at the home after the death to deal with re-
maining formalities. At this point, Dr. Green realized that he had not
thought his assistance completely through. If Dr. Green reported suicide
as the cause of death on the death certificate, the medical examiner
would have to be notified and an autopsy would have to be conducted.
Dr. Green wanted to avoid an autopsy for the sake of the family and for
his own interests. He knew that at least at some level what he did was
illegal. Thus, Dr. Green classified the death as natural, resulting from
AIDS. As he filled out the death certificate he knew he was stretching
the truth.
In addition to the entries on the death certificate, Dr. Green was
forced to take other precautions to avoid any detection of what had oc-
curred. Throughout the two months he was with the patient, he did not
keep any official record of their plan. Also, after the death, he removed
all of the empty pill and narcotic containers from the scene. Thus,
through lies and coverups, Dr. Green was able to protect himself while
fulfilling the desire of his patient to end his life.
Dr. Green is just one example of the many doctors that have become
involved in the secret practice of physician-assisted suicide. 6 Unfortu-
6. Many terms have been used to describe assisted suicide, including "physician-assisted
suicide," "rational suicide," "self-deliverance," "passive euthanasia," "active voluntary eutha-
nasia," and "mercy killing." "Self-deliverance" is the term used by the Hemlock Society, an
organization formed in 1980 in Los Angeles to campaign for the right of a terminally ill person
to choose assisted suicide. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT 201 (1991). "Mercy killing" is
defined as euthanasia or the "affirmative act of bringing about immediate death allegedly in a
painless way and generally administered by one who thinks that the dying person wishes to die
because of a terminal or hopeless disease or condition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (6th
ed. 1990).
A distinction is often made between assistance involving an affirmative act by the person
helping, whether it be a doctor, family member, or friend, and passive assistance in the form of
providing information or the means necessary to commit the act. Both the New England
Journal of Medicine and the Journal of the American Medical Association distinguish physi-
cian-assisted suicide (as passive) from euthanasia (as active): "Assisted suicide... differs from
euthanasia in the extent to which the physician participated in the process. In assisted suicide,
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nately, this secret practice of assisted suicide "has left little information
available on the perilous realities of this controversial and officially con-
demned practice: how a doctor decides; what criteria were used; and,
finally, how death is assisted."'7
Despite participants' secrecy, however, the controversy over physi-
cian-assisted suicide has heated up with the failure of recent legislative
attempts at legalizing physician-assisted suicide8 and the constant news
coverage about Dr. Jack Kevorkian, dubbed "Doctor Death" and "the
Suicide Doctor." While the right to refuse treatment has gained legal
acceptance,9 disagreement still exists over the legality of providing af-
firmative assistance to a patient in ending her life. However, the objec-
tives of both procedures are so similar that to criminalize the latter while
constitutionally protecting the former is arguably hypocritical. 10 Addi-
tionally, despite the prohibition of assisted suicides in most states, the
acts still often occur, 1 and the current law does not protect the interests
of those involved.
The United States Supreme Court recently recognized that the
"right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional
right to privacy."' 2 Recognizing that patients have the right to refuse
treatment provides a first step toward assuring terminally ill patients the
right to autonomy and self-determination. In fact, some commentators
have argued that the constitutional right to privacy includes the right to
assisted suicide.' 3 The Supreme Court has never accepted this view.' 4
Other commentators have suggested that international human rights law
the patient performs the life-ending act under the physician's guidance, while in euthanasia,
the physician administers the death-causing drug or other agent." David Orentlicher, Physi-
cian Participation in Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844, 1844 (1989); see also Sidney H. Wan-
zer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Il Patients, 320 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 844, 848 (1989).
This Note uses the term "assisted suicide" to refer to all actions, passive and active, which
assist terminally ill patients in ending their lives. For the purposes of this Note, passive suicide
does not include withdrawing or withholding treatment, but describes assisting suicide through
providing the necessary information, drugs, or means for the patient to commit suicide.
7. Lehr, supra note 3, at 1.
8. See infra notes 216-221 and accompanying text.
9. See, eg., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, 670 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
10. See infra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
12. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7; see also Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220,
225 (1984) ("The right of a competent adult patient to refuse medical treatment has its origins
in the constitutional right of privacy.").
13. See, eg., George C. Garbesi, The Law of Assisted Suicide, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 93,
107-08 (1987).
14. "'Tlhere is no significant support for the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in
our tradition that it may be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.. ..." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Thomas J. Marzen et al.,
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protecting individual autonomy should encompass assisted suicide, at
least for the terminally ill. 15 Lastly, some commentators have proposed
assisted suicide as "good public policy based on principles of autonomy
and self-determination-the right to control one's body, destiny, and
health care." 16
This Note does not attempt to resolve the issues of whether assisted
suicide is constitutionally or internationally protected. Instead, it focuses
on the need for legislation in this area of the law. The issue of physician-
assisted suicide involves fundamental public policy questions which are
more appropriately resolved by the legislature and not the judiciary. Re-
cently, there has been an increase in societal support for the concept of
legalized assisted suicide. 17 Citizens, through their elected representa-
tives, should enact laws which permit the terminally ill to legally choose
physician-assisted suicide as a means to end their pain and suffering. If
the question is left to the judiciary, courts may have difficulty finding a
"right" to assisted suicide rooted in the Constitution. Moreover, even if
courts could find a constitutional basis for such a right, they would have
difficulty providing explicit guidelines to describe the extent of the right.
On the other hand, if the states legislate thorough guidelines regard-
ing physician-assisted suicide, courts will only have to determine whether
an assisted suicide was done in accordance with set standards. Legisla-
tors could hold hearings and consider the opinions of professionals to
create legislation allowing legalized physician-assisted suicide in accord-
ance with specific guidelines.
State legislatures have already taken steps toward allowing patients
autonomy and control over their health care.18 State legislatures must
now take the next logical step. They must decide what to do about com-
petent, terminally ill patients who are in great pain and wish to end their
suffering, yet can survive without extraordinary medical treatment. 19
This Note attempts to show why this legislation is needed and pro-
poses a plan for legislatures to follow. Part I of this Note examines the
reality of assisted suicides and the probable rise in their frequency with
technological advances in medicine. Based on this realization, Part I ar-
gues that state legislatures must confront the inevitability of assisted sui-
cide by providing realistic guidelines that will protect the interests of
patients and doctors and will deter abuses. Part II addresses current
Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 100 (1985) (quoting Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
15. Garbesi, supra note 13, at 10 n.81.
16. Victor G. Rosenblum & Clarke D. Forsythe, The Right to Assisted Suicide: Protec-
tion of Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 6 IssUEs L. & MED. 3, 20 (1990).
17. See infra notes 207-212 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 145-149.
19. Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 348, 368 (1986).
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legal, medical, and public views about physician-assisted suicide. Part
III considers past attempts at legislation of physician-assisted suicide and
possible reasons for their failure. Additionally, it briefly analyzes the re-
cent legalization of assisted suicide in the Netherlands as a potential
guideline for the United States. Finally, Part IV proposes legislation that
would allow physician-assisted suicide to be performed in a safe and con-
trolled manner.
I. Questioning the Law
Currently, most states have laws prohibiting assisted suicide.20
However, the effectiveness of these laws is questionable. Without any
legal alternatives for the terminally ill to end their pain and indignation
through death, patients are left with the Hobson's choice of either suffer-
ing or evading the law. Subpart A of Part I discusses the current laws
against assisted suicide. Subpart B describes the overall lack of enforce-
ment of these laws. Subpart C explains the dangers involved when termi-
nally ill people attempt to bypass the law. Subpart D exposes the fact
that, despite the laws, numerous doctors currently assist terminally ill
patients in dying. Finally, Subpart E describes people who choose to end
their suffering by killing themselves. Terminally ill people who choose to
evade the law, either through the help of family, friends, or a sympathetic
doctor, are faced with numerous risks, both for themselves and those
from whom they ask for help. Physician-assisted suicide must be legal-
ized and carefully regulated to eliminate these risks and to protect every-
one involved.
20. ALAsKA STAT. § l1.41.120(a)(2) (1989); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3)
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West
1988); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 782.08 (West 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-
2 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204
(West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105(1) (1991);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C: 11-6 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30
(McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§§ 813-818 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125(1)(b) (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2505 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-16-37 to -39 (1988); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.08 (West 1989); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982). For text of the statutes, see Juliana Reno, Comment, A Little
Help From My Friends: The Legal Status of Assisted Suicide, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1151,
1175-83 (1992) (Appendix).
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A. Laws Prohibiting Assisted Suicide
A majority of states currently have statutes prohibiting assisted sui-
cide.2 1 These statutes either categorize successfully aiding suicide as
murder or manslaughter, or they create a specific crime. 22 For example,
California's statute against assisted suicide, unchanged since its adoption
in 1873, provides that "every person who deliberately aids or advises, or
encourages another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony."'23
Some states make a distinction between aiding a suicide and mur-
dering a willing victim. 24 Oregon,25 for example, will charge a person
who provides another with the means to commit suicide under the states'
assisted suicide statute.26 However, a person who actually commits the
act that results in the death of another is charged with murder, instead of
aiding a suicide.27
The Model Penal Code suggests another approach: varying the
punishment depending on the intent of the assistant and the outcome.
The Model Penal Code finds criminal homicide when a person "pur-
posely causes ... suicide by force, duress or deception. ' 28 If the person
merely "aids or solicits another to commit suicide," the charge depends
on the result of the aid.29 If a suicide or attempted suicide results from a
person's aid or solicitation, the crime is a second degree felony.3 0 If no
suicide or attempted suicide results, the crime is a misdemeanor.3 '
By prohibiting assisted suicide these state statutes and the Model
Penal Code prevent the terminally ill from requesting aid from others
without also requesting that they break the law. Since "the consent of
21. See supra note 20.
22. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Cr-
tique of Legal Sanctions, 36 Sw. L.J. 1003, 1019 (1982).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988).
24. The distinction, according to the Oregon Supreme Court, is as follows:
[Tihe [Oregon] statute [on assisted suicide] does not contemplate active participation
by one in the overt act directly causing death. It contemplates some participation in
the events leading up to the commission of the final overt act, such as furnishing the
means of bringing about death-the gun, the knife, the poison, or providing the
water, for the use of the person who himself commits the act of self-murder. But
where a person actually performs, or actively assists in performing, the overt act
resulting in death, such as shooting or stabbing the victim, administering the poison,
or holding one under water until death takes place by drowning, his act constitutes
murder, and it is wholly immaterial whether this act is committed pursuant to an
agreement with the victim, such as a mutual suicide pact.
State v. Bouse, 264 P.2d 800, 812 (Or. 1953).
25. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125(1)(b).
26. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 351 n.32.
27. Id.
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(1) (Tentative Draft 1962).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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the victim of a homicide is not of itself a defense to a charge of murder
... an expressed desire or plea for another to end one's life will not avail
the defendant."'32 Purportedly, these statutes are designed to protect the
suicidal individual by providing a bright line rule against improper mo-
tives of or undue influence by those who assist.3 3 However, given the
inevitability of assisted suicide,34 these statutes fail to address the real
interests of the terminally ill patient who wants to die. By criminalizing
all assisted suicide, these statutes fail to "provid[e] some guiding frame-
work for a terminally-ill patient seeking choices for relieving his or her
pain."' 35 Legislatures must create laws that continue to protect against
potential abuse but also provide the means for competent terminally ill
patients to rationally choose assisted suicide.
B. Lack of Enforcement of the Laws
Despite the prohibition against assisting suicide, there appears to be
a lack of enforcement of the law. One author noted:
The current law is being ignored. Police are not reporting mercy kill-
ings and assisted suicides; district attorneys are not prosecuting them;
grand juries are not indicting; and, when a rare case does go to trial,
juries are acquitting. Is this better than having a law that would pro-
vide regulations about a practice that desperate people are exercising
surreptitiously?3 6
The reasons for this lack of enforcement are multifarious. Most of
the documented reports of assisted suicides do not come from case law, 37
but from newspaper articles38 and personal accounts, 39 possibly indicat-
ing prosecutors' decisions not to prosecute these cases. Prosecutors have
broad discretion in deciding whether to bring charges for assisting in a
suicide. For example, "[a] member of the New York County District
Attorney's office in Manhattan observed that a case-by-case method is
used to evaluate suicide incidents brought under specific state laws
32. Garbesi, supra note 13, at 95-96.
33. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 358.
34. See infra Part I.B-E.
35. Laura L. Marcinko, Comment, To Live or Die: Creating a Choice of Medically As-
sisted Suicide in Michigan's Proposed Law, 8 COOLEY L. Rxv. 609, 621 (1991).
36. Faye J. Girsh, Physician Aid in Dying, 157 W. J. MED. 188, 188-89 (1992).
37. From 1930 to 1985 no state court decisions on actual prosecution for assisted suicide
appeared in any of the official state reporters. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 358. Similarly, as of
1982, "[n]o published American opinions.., reported convictions of physicians for aiding,
abetting, or assisting suicide." Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 22, at 1029.
38. For example, "[o]ne reporter profiled a woman with 'Lou Gehrig's disease' whose
death was secretly arranged, at her request, to occur 'on a couch at home."' Shaffer, supra
note 19, at 369 & n.120 (citing Andrew H. Malcolm, To Suffer a Prolonged Illness or Elect to
Die: A Case Study, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1984, § 1, at 1); see also infra notes 42-52 and
accompanying text.
39. DEREK HUMPHRY, JEAN'S WAY (1991).
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prohibiting either aiding or abetting suicide."'' It appears that many
prosecutors will not prosecute if they believe that the act was done out of
compassion for an ailing loved one.41 In 1977, it was reported that
[n]o charges were brought against a man who reported to the District
Attorney that he had permitted a 75-year-old friend who suffered from
Parkinson's disease to use his home to commit suicide by taking an
overdose of drugs. The decedent, the man said, had been a friend for
over 39 years.42
Even when charges are brought, sympathetic juries often refuse to
convict.43 For example, in 1992, after only ninety minutes of delibera-
tion, a jury acquitted Dick Bauer of manslaughter for "giving his chroni-
cally ill mother the gun that she used to kill herself a few minutes
later."44
Similarly, physicians prosecuted for assisted suicide traditionally
have not been convicted. In 1950, a New York Times article reported
that a doctor was acquitted after injecting "a fatal air embolism into the
blood vessels of a carcinoma patient, who had repeatedly urged him to
end her misery."45 In 1973, a New York doctor was found not guilty of
assisting suicide after administering a lethal injection to a comatose pa-
tient.46 More recently, a grand jury decided not to indict Dr. Timothy
Quill, who admitted in the New England Journal of Medicine that he
aided a terminally ill patient in committing suicide by prescribing the
barbiturates she used to end her life. 47 One author noted that "[i]n a
40. George P. Smith II, All's Well that Ends Well Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational
Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 311 & n.270
(1989) (citing James Podgers, 'Rational Suicide' Raises Patient Rights Issues, 66 A.B.A. J.
1499, 1501 (1980)).
41. See, e.g., Michael Winerip, Prosecutor Ponders Mercy for Mercy-Killing Doctor, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1986, at B4 (describing the difficulty of determining a sentence for mercy
killers).
42. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 360 n.76 (citing Associated Press, Swarthmore, Pa., Oct. 17,
1977).
43. "Even if there is a full-blown trial, experience of recent euthanasia trials points to...
'jury nullification' .... There is now a considerable record of grand juries refusing to indict,
and juries refusing to convict, in euthanasia trials." Derek Humphry, Dr. Kevorkian's Assisted
Suicide Tactics Could Derail Law Reform, HEMLOCK Q., Apr. 1992, at 5; see, e.g., Doctor
Freed in Wife's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1988, at A20; Florida Doctor Acquitted in Mercy
Killing of Wife, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1988, § 1, at 21.
44. Acquittal in Aided Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992, § 1, at 10.
45. Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 22, at 1029 & n.127 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1950, at 1).
46. Id. at 1029 (citing HouSTON CHRON., June 22, 1973, § 4, at 10).
47. Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?, 267 JAMA
2658, 2658 (1992); see also David R. Schanker, Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation,
and the Health Care Crisis, 68 IND. L.J. 977, 986 n.41 (1993) (citing DEREK HUMPHRY, EU-
THANASIA 129-35 (1991)) ("In Michigan in 1989, Dr. Donald Carraccio pleaded guilty to the
murder by lethal injection of a comatose 74-year-old woman; he received 5 years probation
with community service.").
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state where individuals convicted of assisted suicide could face between
five and ten years in prison, the grand jury's decision was an important
indicator of the general direction of the debate over euthanasia in this
country. '48
In the unusual instance when someone is convicted for assisting sui-
cide, the sentence tends to be light and the defendants generally receive
probation time.49 For example, a retired Florida man assisted his cancer-
ridden wife in committing suicide by preparing an overdose of sedatives
and then helping her put a plastic bag over her head.50 When he con-
fessed two years later, he was sentenced to only one year of probation,
forty hours of community service, and continued psychiatric treatment
under a statute which had a possible fifteen year maximum penalty.51
C. Dangers in Bypassing the Law
The failure of state legislatures to confront the realities of assisted
suicide dooms suicidal patients to inadequate means by which to accom-
plish their goals. Since no states have legalized physician-assisted sui-
cide, usually terminally ill people who wish to end their suffering through
48. Blendon, supra note 47, at 2658.
49. "Jesse James Quinn, age eighty-seven, was arraigned on January 23, 1992, for helping
his wife commit suicide by leaving a gun on her nightstand. The case was resolved by thejudge without a guilty or innocent plea; Mr. Quinn agreed to undergo counseling for a year
and give up his firearms in return for eventual dismissal of charges." Cheryl K. Smith, Wat
About Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 IssuEs L. & MED. 503, 508 (1993) (citing SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 24, 1992, at BI).
Wallace Cooper pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter for giving a lethal injection of
morphine and the heart drug digoxin to his uncle, who was suffering from three terminal
illnesses: congestive heart failure, kidney failure, and chronic intestinal bleeding. Love and
Death. A Mercy Killer's Anguish, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1986, at 1. The Superior Court Judge
sentenced Cooper to five years probation, finding that his actions were motivated by compas-
sion and not malice. Id.
Prosecutors dropped a murder charge and recommended probation of Jay McFadden,
who pleaded guilty to a lesser charge in the "mercy killing" of his wife, who had been suffering
from multiple sclerosis. Murder Charge Dropped in Mercy Killing, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1986,
at 1.
A doctor was sentenced to two years probation for the mercy-killing of his mother-in-law.
Alfonso A. Navarez. Doctor is Spared Jail Term in Mercy Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1986,
§ 1, at 29.
A Michigan court convicted a man of manslaughter after he helped his 65-year-old ailing
wife commit suicide with carbon monoxide. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1975, at B5. He was sen-
tenced to 30 months probation and fined $3,750. Id
An elderly woman received a six year suspended sentence after a no contest plea to a
voluntary manslaughter charge based on her assistance to her 81-year-old sister suffering from
a painful, deteriorating heart condition. Candee Wilde, UPI, May 26, 1982, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI File.
50. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 360 n.79 (citing UPI, Sept. 11, 1984).
51. Id
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death have only family and loved ones to turn to for assistance. 52 As a
result, a request for assistance presents a unique dilemma to those asked
to assist: assisting suicide is illegal, yet refusing to assist would deny a
terminally ill loved one relief from pain and distress.
Even if a friend or family member agrees to assist in the suicide,
they might not know what to do or have the courage to complete the
action. For example, a 1992 San Francisco Chronicle article featured
Steven Shiflett, an AIDS patient who planned his death by requesting a
friend to administer a lethal injection.53 Steven thought he had chosen
an appropriate and reliable friend to help him die because the friend was
also infected with the AIDS virus and "spoke confidently of how he had
helped four other AIDS patients die, smothering one by holding his hand
over his mouth and pinching his nose."' 54 When the time came for the
friend to administer the lethal injections, however, he lost his nerve and
deserted Steven with the job only half finished. 55 Fortunately, other
friends were present. They called Steven's doctor, who knew of Steven's
desire to die and who told them how to complete the assisted suicide. 56
Reflecting on the situation, the doctor felt as if he had "crossed the line"
by instructing Steven's friends, but he realized that "Steven was looking
to shorten his death, not to shorten his life."'57
D. Physicians Assisting Suicide
Until assisted suicide is legalized, the most capable assistants, physi-
cians, will be even more hesitant than family or friends to assist termi-
nally ill patients in death. When physicians make the choice to assist in
suicide, they risk not only potential criminal liability, but also damage to
their careers. Moreover, physicians who agree to assist with a suicide
violate the medical profession's published guidelines as well as the law. 58
Despite the risks to their careers, many doctors have reported assist-
ing terminally ill patients in dying.59 Dr. Jack Kevorkian is the most
publicized physician performing assisted suicide. In 1990, Kevorkian as-
sisted Janet Adkins, a fifty-four-year-old woman with early Alzheimer's
disease, in ending her life by the use of his "suicide machine." 6 Murder
52. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
53. Lori Olszewski, One Man's Choice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1992, at Al.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Fred Rosner et al., Physician-assisted Suicide, 92 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 388, 391
(1992) (explaining that the American Medical Association takes the position that "physicians
should not perform euthanasia or participate in assisted suicide").
59. See text infra at notes 110-113.
60. Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die, 325 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1100 (1991). Kevorkian's original suicide machine consisted of an intra-
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charges were brought against the doctor. However, since Michigan did
not at that time have a statute prohibiting assisted suicide and Kevorkian
did not affirmatively act to assist in Adkins's death, the charges were
dismissed. A Michigan circuit court held that "in the absence of specific
laws against assisting suicide, there could be no probable cause that the
doctor had committed murder."' 61 The court did, however, invoke Mich-
igan criminal law and the Public Health Code to support an injunction
prohibiting Kevorkian from using his "suicide machine" in the future.62
Nevertheless, Kevorkian indicated that he intended to use his machine
on other occasions and to establish a practice of rational suicide. 63
Kevorkian's actions led to the suspension of his Michigan medical
license in 1991. 4 Ignoring the suspension of his license and the injunc-
tion prohibiting him from assisting suicides, Kevorkian assisted in the
deaths of two more women in 1992.65 Following Kevorkian's actions,
legislation was signed by the Michigan governor establishing assisted sui-
cide as a felony punishable by up to four years in prison and a $2,000
fine. 66 The law was scheduled to take effect ninety days after its passage.
In the meantime, Kevorkian continued assisting others. 67 Kevorkian
venous tube connected to three bottles containing three different solutions. Kevorkian inserted
the tube into Janet Adkins's arm and began a drip of harmless saline solution through it.
Adkins then pressed a button which replaced the saline with thiopental, a coma-inducing drug.
A minute later the machine switched solutions again to potassium chloride, which stopped her
heart and caused her death within minutes. Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His
Suicide Device, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6, 1990, at Al. After Kevorkian's medical license was sus-
pended, see infra note 64 and accompanying text, he could no longer obtain potassium chloride
so he switched to carbon monoxide gas as a means of death. To begin the flow of gas, the
individual would pull a string attached to a clip on a plastic tube running from the carbon
monoxide to the mask covering her face. Within minutes, the person would be dead. David
Margolic, Doctor Who Assists Suicides Makes Macabre Mundane, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993,
at Al.
61. Tamar Lewin, Doctor Cleared of Murdering Woman with Suicide Machine, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at B6.
62. People v. Kevorkian, No. 90-390963 AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1991), appeal dock-
eted, No. 138155-6 (Mich. Ct. App. May 18, 1992).
63. Marcinko, supra note 35, at 628.
64. In Wake of 3 Suicides, Dr. Kevorkian Loses Michigan License, CHi. TRIB., Nov. 21,
1991, at C16 (stating that on November 20, 1991, the Michigan Medical Association sus-
pended Kevorkian's license to practice medicine in that state). Additionally, California re-
voked Dr. Kevorkian's medical license on April 27, 1993. Steve Marshall, "Dr. Death"Loses
California License, USA TODAY, April 28, 1993, at 3A. In a telephone interview with the
Associated Press, Kevorkian stated, "The license is immaterial to me as long as I can help
suffering humans." Id
65. Suicide Doctor Helps Two More Women Die, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 1992, at A3.
66. I1d
67. See, eg., Kevorkian Helps Another Suicide, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1993 at A5; Kevor-
kian Helps 2 More With Suicide, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1993, at A10; Suicide Doctor Assists in
10th, 11th Deaths, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 5, 1993, at A3.
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claimed that even after the law took effect on March 30, 1993, he would
continue to assist people in ending their lives. 68
In an effort to halt Kevorkian's actions, the Michigan Senate and
House of Representatives approved legislation that would move the effec-
tive date of the ban against assisted suicide up to February 25, 1993.69
The governor signed the new legislation hours after its approval. 70 Al-
most immediately, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) an-
nounced plans to challenge the new law.7 1 The ACLU filed a suit on
behalf of some terminally ill cancer patients, at least six physicians who
treat fatal illnesses, and the Michigan chapter of the American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons. 72
The same day that the legislation was signed, Michigan police
searched Kevorkian's home and the home of his assistant, Neal Nicol. 73
The police stated that they were conducting a murder investigation for
the death of Hugh Gale, the thirteenth person to die with Kevorkian's
assistance. 74 The investigation was prompted by a report retrieved by a
member of the Christian Defense Coalition, an offshoot of Operation
Rescue, from the trash outside Nicol's home.75 The report stated that
while Gale had asked Kevorkian to stop the procedure twice, Kevorkian
only had removed the mask supplying carbon monoxide the first time.76
Gale's widow and Kevorkian's attorneys denied that there was ever a
request to stop the procedure. 77 They claimed that the report was an
erroneous description of what had happened, which was discarded once
the errors were discovered.78 The police found a second report in Kevor-
kian's apartment which did not refer to any second request. 79
Macomb County prosecutor Carl Marlinga stated that prosecuting
Kevorkian would be difficult, even if they could prove that the report of
the second request was accurate.80 Marlinga explained, "Even assuming
we could prove that Mr. Gale was asking that the mask be removed...
68. See, e.g., Suicide Doctor Assists in 10th, 11th Deaths, supra note 67.
69. Jacquelyn Boyle, Kevorkian Feels Heat: Assisted Suicide Made Illegal, DET. FREE
PRESS, Feb. 26, 1993, at IA.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Edward Walsh, Prosecutor, Kevorkian Mull Next Step; Critics Say Man Tried to Abort
His Suicide, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1993, at A3; Widow Says Husband Did Not Ask Kevorkian
to Stop, STAR TRIB. (Detroit), Feb. 27, 1993, at 7A.
78. Walsh, supra note 77, at A3.
79. Id.
80. Carol J. Castaneda, Aided-Suicide Ban Faces Challenge; ACLU Says the Decision to
Die an Individual Right, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1993, at 6A.
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that still doesn't mean we could move to a homicide charge without ana-
lyzing what Kevorkian's legal obligations were in that situation. 81 Since
the Michigan law prohibiting assisted suicide was not in effect at the time
of Gale's death, Kevorkian could not be prosecuted under that law.
Kevorkian never was charged with Gale's death.8 2 Marlinga found that
"[t]hose present at the time of [Gale's] death did nothing more than pro-
vide a means for him to accomplish a result he desired. ' 83 Marlinga's
decision not to prosecute was made while the ACLU's suit challenging
Michigan's newly enacted law was still pending.
Kevorkian was arrested again after his sixteenth assisted suicide.84
It was the first assisted suicide in which he participated since Michigan's
ban took effect.85 Kevorkian's action was contrary to his earlier state-
ments that he would wait until the ACLU had completed its constitu-
tional challenge to the law before performing any additional suicides. 86
However, before Kevorkian could be charged with committing a felony,
Judge Cynthia Stevens, a Wayne County Circuit Court judge, struck
down the law on technical grounds. She ruled that it had been passed
before the required legislative hearings were held.8 7
The court of appeal subsequently stayed Judge Stevens' decision.88
Consequently, the legal status of the Michigan assisted suicide law has
been undetermined. 9 With the law in a state of flux, Kevorkian has
dared authorities to prosecute him by assisting in the death of a seven-
teenth person. 90 The day after the death, Kevorkian provided details of
the suicide in an effort to speed up the arrest process so that the issue of
assisted suicide would be resolved. 91 Kevorkian "supplied the carbon
81. Id
82. Id.
83. Marshall, supra note 64.
84. Carol J. Castaneda, Kevorkian Defies Law, Aids Suicide, USA TODAY, May 17, 1993,
at IA.
85. Id
86. Carol J. Castaneda, Kevorkian Tests Michigan Law; Arrested After Aiding 16th Sui-
cide, USA TODAY, May 17, 1993, at 3A.
87. Defiant Doctor helps With 17th Suicide Despite State Ban, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1993,
at A2.
88. Id.
89. Id,
90. Id. Thomas W. Hyde, the youngest person (age 30) to commit suicide with Kevor-
kian's assistance, was suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease. Id.
91. Suicide Doctor Tries to Speed Up Own Arrest, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 1993, at A3.
Kevorkian stated:
I drove [Hyde] to Belle Isle. I supplied the gas. I supplied the tubing and the mask
and all necessary equipment. I connected the tubing to the tank. I put the clip on
the tubing. I put the mask over Mr. Hyde's face because he could not move that
much .... I turned on the gas by the main valve on the tank.... I asked him one
more time if he was sure what he was doing.... He looked up with a sort of pleasant
face and pleasant eyes and a moan or two and I thought I heard him say, 'I'm fine.'
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monoxide, tubing, face mask and other equipment for Thomas Hyde to
take his life."'92 Additionally, he "put the mask over Hyde's face because
[Hyde] could not move." 93 However, Hyde himself pulled the string that
released the flow of deadly gas into the mask.94
On August 17, 1993, John O'Hair, Wayne County prosecutor, de-
cided to prosecute Kevorkian under Michigan's assisted-suicide law. 95
O'Hair stated that Kevorkian violated the existing law and therefore
must be prosecuted. However, despite his obligation under the law to
prosecute Kevorkian, O'Hair stated that he supported the idea of legal-
ized physician-assisted suicide and that he would recommend its legaliza-
tion to a state panel studying the issue.96 O'Hair hoped that prosecuting
Kevorkian would incite the state legislature and the courts to resolve the
issue of physician-assisted suicide.97
On September 9, 1993, Kevorkian was ordered to stand trial for as-
sisting in the death of Thomas Hyde.98 Detroit District Judge Willie G.
Lipscomb, Jr. set arraignment for September 24, 1993. 99 The Washing-
ton Post reported that Lipscomb stated that Kevorkian was "a very cou-
rageous person" for "bringing this issue to the forefront.'' °
Additionally, Judge Lipscomb reportedly stated in his ruling that he sup-
ported the idea of having state legislatures regulate physician-assisted su-
icide instead of leaving it to the discretion of individual doctors and their
patients. 10 1
Kevorkian remained free on a personal bond pending his trial. 102 A
few hours after Judge Lipscomb's order to stand trial, Kevorkian partici-
pated in his eighteenth suicide. 0 3 As a result of his action, Kevorkian
faced a second felony charge. This time the assistant prosecutor han-
dling the case asked for a $250,000 cash or surety bond in an effort to
keep Kevorkian in jail.1°4 Judge Richard Manning instead imposed a
$10,000 cash bond with the explicit condition that Kevorkian refrain
David Zeman, Kevorkian Hands Prosecutor Keys to Case; He Tells His Role in Latest Suicide,
DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 6, 1993, at Al.
92. Suicide Doctor Tries to Speed up Own Arrest, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Don Terry, Kevorkian Gets the Showdown He Asked For, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18,
1993, at Al.
96. Id. at A13.
97. Id.
98. Edward Walsh, Dr. Death Ordered to Stand Trial; Charge Stems from Latest of 17
Suicides Kevorkian Has Assisted, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1993, at A3.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Kevorkian Charged in Latest Suicide, CHI. TRIH., Sept. 15, 1993, at 3M.
103. Id.
104. David Zeman, Kevorkian Charged, Remains Free; Bond Posted in 2nd Suicide Case,
DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 15, 1993, at lB.
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from assisting in any additional suicides while the case was pending.10 5
It seems unlikely that this mandate will affect any of Kevorkian's future
decisions regarding helping someone to die. In an interview, Kevorkian
stated, "'As long as there's one suffering patient, if only person supports
me, I would still do this.... I couldn't live with myself otherwise, be-
cause it's right.' "106
Although Kevorkian has helped to bring the issue of physician-as-
sisted suicide into the limelight, many commentators question his actions
and judgment. Many people who support physician-assisted suicide do
not support his methods.10 7 One commentator noted, "[Kevorkian has]
ignited debate, just as he sought to do. But his clumsy suicide machines,
turned over to patients he barely knows, with the entire spectacle
replayed on TV, make a mockery of the term."10 8 These commentators
believe that Kevorkian's actions actually hinder the movement toward
legalizing physician-assisted suicide.
While Kevorkian's physician-assisted suicides have received the
most publicity, he is not the first physician to assist terminally ill patients
in dying.10 9 Kevorkian's tactics have helped to focus America's attention
on the debate but he is not alone in the practice of physician-assisted
suicide. It is unknown exactly how many physicians participate in as-
sisted suicide, but it is certainly not an uncommon occurrence.110
"[M]any physicians privately admit that they helped patients with incur-
able illnesses by injecting overdoses or writing prescriptions for drugs
potent enough to end their patients' suffering." '' In one study, forty
percent of the doctors surveyed said that they had aided at least one
terminally ill patient in dying." 2 Another survey found that forty-five
105. Id.
106. David Zeman, Kevorkian's Bond May be Shaky; Angry Prosecutor May Jail Him Fol-
lowing 18th Assisted Suicide, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 11, 1993, at 3A.
107. HUMPHRY, supra note 6, at 153 (noting that even those from the progressive wing of
the medical profession, who supported Kevorkian initially, later withdrew their support). For
a response to Kevorkian's actions, see Isabel Wilkerson, Opponents Weigh Action Against Doc-
tor Who Aided Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at A10.
108. Kevorkian May Harm Death-With-Dignity Cause, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 1993, at
12A.
109. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
110. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 370 ("In the area of 'negotiated death'-the consensual
termination with doctors, lawyers, and family members of a terminally ill or comatose person's
life-indications are that cases of suicide assistance are common.").
111. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 2021, 2021 & n.7 (1992) (quoting Lawrence K. Altman, More Physicians Broach Forbid-
den Subject of Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1991, at C3); see also Lawrence K. Altman,
Dr. Says He Gave Patient Drug to Help Her Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A1,
B8; Richard A. Knox, One in Five Doctors Say They Assisted a Patient's Death, Survey Finds,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1992, at 5.
112. Patty Fisher, Whose Death Is It Anyway?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Oct. 4, 1992,
at 7P.
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percent of the physician respondents had taken clinical actions that
would indirectly cause a patient's death, while 9.4 percent took actions
that directly caused death.113
Interviews this year by The Boston Globe uncovered doctors who
engage in the hidden practice of physician-assisted suicide.'1 4 One doc-
tor, a veteran oncologist at one of Boston's leading hospitals, admitted to
helping as many as twenty-five patients to die over the past two de-
cades. 115 He was assisted by his nurse, who administered a lethal mix of
morphine patches, tablets, and elixirs to the patient.'" 6 The doctor noted
that if authorities were to compare his escalating morphine prescriptions,
which are recorded with the Food and Drug Administration, with the
obituaries, they probably would become suspicious. 117 However, he
knows that he could cover himself by stating that his patient was in terri-
ble, unremitting pain and that he merely tried to comfort her."l8
Although some physicians practice assisted suicide, legally they are
in an awkward position. Doctors must "either ignore [the law] and qui-
etly perform euthanasia-creating an unregulated and unpoliced area of
medicine--or... avoid performing medically acceptable acts of assist-
ance for fear of liability.""19 Without the legalization of the process,
physicians must act secretly, without the benefit of consultation with col-
leagues regarding whether a patient's choice is rational, 120 and without
established guidelines for the process itself. Proper legislation could es-
tablish guidelines for what is a currently an unregulated practice.
E. Self-Assisted Suicide
Until assisted suicide is legalized, some patients will take matters
into their own hands, rather than subject their doctor or loved ones to
possible criminal prosecution. To help these patients achieve their goals,
a number of do-it-yourself suicide manuals, which provide guidelines for
committing suicide, have been published. The Society for the Right to
Die With Dignity (EXIT) published the first manual in London. 12 1 Sub-
sequently, two French authors, members of the French Association for
the Right to Die in Dignity (ADMA), co-authored Suicide: Operating
113. Rosner, supra note 58, at 389 (citing G.A. Kanoti & J.P. Orlowski, National survey:
Physicians' Views on the Right to Die, 31 PHYSICIAN'S MGMT. 40, 76 (1991)).
114. Dick Lehr, Increasingly, Secretly, Physicians are helping the Incurable Ill to Die, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1993, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Note, supra note 111, at 2039.
120. Wanzer et al., supra note 6, at 848.
121. Smith, supra note 40, at 303 & n.199 (citing SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE WITH
DIGNITY (EXIT), A GUIDE TO SELF-DELIVERANCE 1 (1981)).
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Instructions.122 In 1991, Derek Humphry, founder and director of the
National Hemlock Society, wrote Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-
Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying.123 This book provides a
step-by-step description of how to commit suicide and includes tables
describing the proper drugs and amounts necessary to end one's life. 124
Final Exit became the number one best-selling nonfiction hardcover book
in America in 1991 and topped the New York Times' best-seller list for
eighteen weeks, demonstrating the public interest in this area.125
In June of this year, Humphry led a seminar in San Francisco where
he discussed "which drugs to use for suicide, how to avoid a botched
attempt and whether to involve.., loved ones and doctors." 126 The
seminar was attended by over 150 people. 127 A few of those attending
had cancer or were friends or relatives of someone who did, but most of
those in attendance were gay men with AIDS. 128 Humphry's presenta-
tion included a demonstration of how to use a plastic bag and a rubber
band for self-asphyxiation.12 9 Despite California's statute prohibiting
aiding, encouraging, or assisting another to commit suicide,130 seminars
and books on assisting suicide are "widely assumed to be protected by
the Constitution's free speech guarantees."' 131 Furthermore, a newly or-
ganized group, called Compassion in Dying, announced plans to offer
terminally ill patients the names of drugs that could be deadly. 132 The
group will not, however, assist in administering the drugs.133
While these organizations and guides may provide valuable informa-
tion that is difficult to obtain elsewhere, the use of such information
could result in unsuccessful attempted suicides. As a result of an unsuc-
cessful attempted suicide, the patient could be left in a debilitative, un-
dignified, and dependent situation equal to or worse than that which she
was trying to avoid. One physician describes the problem as follows:
An overdose of drugs taken orally is uncertain. The patient may vomit
the drugs or may fall into a deep sleep only to wake again to the prob-
lem. The patient may have to rush to the end for fear of losing control
of the situation with hospitalization. Unfortunately, without a cooper-
122. Id. at 307 & n.236.
123. HUMPHRY, supra note 6.
124. Id at 121-30.
125. Id at xv.
126. Hemlock Society Holds Seminar for Those Diagnosed with AIDS, STAR TRIB. (De-
troit), June 21, 1993, at 7A.
127. Id
128. Id
129. Id
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988).
131. Hemlock Society Holds Seminar, supra note 126.
132. Elisabeth Dunham, New Group is Offering Life-or-Death Advice, L.A. TIMES, July 25,
1993, at 6B.
133. Id.
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ating physician, the patient has insufficient information on which to
base his decision.134
Additionally, with the self-help approach, the dying patient must end her
life in a secretive and unsupportive condition, instead of in a peaceful
manner surrounded by loved ones. One author notes that often "the ter-
minally ill are forced to spend their last hours alone in order to protect
the ones they love from criminal or civil actions," which "deprives them
of a peaceful and dignified ending" to their lives. 135
Thus, statutes criminalizing assisted suicide often lead to increased
pain, suffering, and loss of dignity for the terminally ill. While it is im-
portant to protect the terminally ill from potential abuse of assisted sui-
cide, legislatures should work toward enacting statutes that "will both
protect the innocent and help the competent terminally ill. '136 Statutes
allowing physician-assisted suicide would serve these interests.
I1. Self-Determination or Self-Destruction?: Current Opinions
Regarding Physician-Assisted Suicide
The legal community, the medical community, and the public are
moving toward acceptance of legalized physician-assisted suicide.
Courts are focusing more on patient autonomy in health care deci-
sions; 137 surveys indicate that a majority of physicians favor legalized
assisted suicide as a health care option;138 and public opinion polls
demonstrate continually increasing societal support for physician-as-
sisted suicide as a legal choice. 139 Expanding support for assisted suicide
is a natural response of an individualistic society in which people strive to
be in control of their fate-especially when it involves life and death is-
sues. Legalizing physician-assisted suicide would accomodate this desire
for self-determination by providing individuals with an option. 140
Much of the opposition to legalization of physician-assisted suicide
is based on the contention that assisted suicide is inherently immoral.
These arguments focus on the idea that society has a strong interest in
134. Stephen K. Yarnell, Euthanasia: Each Story Has Two Sides, S.F. MED., May 1988, at
29.
135. Ann Grace McCoy, HIV Disease: Criminal and Civil Liability for Assisted Suicide, 21
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 437, 485 (1991).
136. Stephen J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Ill and
the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 378 (1984).
137. See infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
140. John O'Hair, the attorney prosecuting Dr. Jack Kevorkian, supports legalization of
physician-assisted suicide. In a plea to the Michigan Commission on Death and Dying to
repeal the state's ban on assisted suicide, he argued that "a majority of people want to chart
their own fate. They want to make their own choice." Lori Montgomery, Panel Won't Fight
Assisted Suicide Ban; O'Hair Seeks Repeal of Law Aimed at Kevorkian, DET. FREE PRESS,
Sept. 2, 1993, at lB.
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protecting all human life regardless of the wishes or beliefs of the person
concerned. 141 This Note does not attempt to argue that an individual is
not entitled to her own moral belief about the sanctity of life and the
value of preserving life. To the contrary, this Note attacks the imposi-
tion of those individuals' beliefs on other individuals who do not share
them. This Part demonstrates that, as the goals of patient autonomy and
self-determination become a more integral part of our social fabric, those
opposing legalized physician-assisted suicide are becoming a minority.
The moral beliefs of a minority of individuals should not dictate the ac-
tions of all of society.' 42 The laws of a society must reflect the moral
views of a majority of its members. Furthermore, when society's views
change, legislatures have a duty to address those changes. One judge
noted, "If mores have changed to the extent that [euthanasia] can now be
sanctioned, I would let that change arrive through the moral judgment of
the people as expressed through their duly elected legislators.. ."43 Es-
pecially in light of the current secret practice of assisted suicide, legisla-
tures are derelict in their duty by failing to respond to the dire need for
regulation in this area.
A. Legal Opinions on Physician-Assisted Suicide
(1) Current Legislation Increasing Autonomy in Health Care Decisions
Currently, no statutes expressly permit physician-assisted suicide.
However, a trend has developed in recent legislation granting patients
more autonomy and personal choice in their heath care decisions. Many
years ago, Justice Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body."' 44 Legislatures have now begun enacting laws that will
enable competent adults to exercise this right. For example, almost
every jurisdiction has living will or natural death legislation. 145 These
devices govern "the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment from an individual in the event of an incurable or irreversible con-
dition that will cause death within a relatively short time, and when such
person is no longer able to make decisions regarding his or her medical
treatment."' 146 Thus, competent individuals are permitted to state in ad-
141. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
142. Prosecuting attorney John O'Hair argued, "If I cannot end my own pain because
somebody's morality would be offended, I find that offensive." Montgomery, supra note 140.
143. In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 458 (Wash. 1987) (Andersen, J., dissenting in part), va-
cated, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988). Although the case involved the withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration, Judge Andersen found those actions to be equivalent to euthanasia.
144. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
145. See Charles P. Sabatino, Death in the Legislature: Inventing Legal Tools for Auton-
omy, 19 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 309, 312 n.6 (1991-92).
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1599 (6th ed. 1990).
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vance their desire to have treatment withheld or withdrawn if they later
become incompetent.
In addition to the living will, the durable power of attorney, which
has been enacted in most states, enhances patient control. 147 This instru-
ment is commonly referred to as a proxy for health care decision making.
A health care power of attorney "establishes a decision maker, chosen by
the principal, who can fully weigh all the circumstances affecting any
health care decision at the time they occur and act in accordance with
the known wishes and values of the principal." 148
These statutes enable the decision maker to instruct the physician to
withhold life-sustaining treatments.1 49 Thus, current legislation mainly
addresses the right of terminally ill patients to direct the withholding or
withdrawal of treatment. The trend has been to grant patient autonomy.
In keeping with this trend legislatures must now address the issue of ter-
minally ill patients who do not require machines to survive, but who wish
to avoid extreme suffering or the loss of dignity.
(2) Extending the Right to Withdraw or Withhold Treatment to Assisted
Suicide Cases
Recent laws and court decisions' 50 focus mainly on the right to
withhold or withdraw treatment, yet many scholars argue that assisted
suicide is not fundamentally or morally different than withholding or
withdrawing medical treatment.' 5 Some commentators argue that by
assisting a patient in suicide, the doctor directly causes death. By with-
drawing treatment, on the other hand, the doctor merely allows the ill-
ness to run its course.' 52 In fact, distinguishing withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration that results in death of a patient from a lethal injection
that merely hastens this result is arguably an illusory distinction. 53
Much of the rationale used by courts in cases involving the withdrawal of
treatment applies directly to cases of assisted suicide.' 54 One court rec-
147. See Sabatino, supra note 145, at 312 n.7.
148. Id. at 314.
149. McCoy, supra note 135, at 446 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2400-2407 (West Supp.
1989)).
150. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 307 (1986) (Compton, J., concurring); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub no. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
151. See Engelhardt & Malloy, supra note 22, at 1023 n.89; Rosenblum & Forsythe, supra
note 16, at 25; Smith, supra note 40, at 337; Note, supra note 11, at 2029-3 1; Note, supra note
136, at 368-69.
152. Patrick Hill, The Right to Die: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 85 S. MED. J. 2S-
55, 2S-56 (1992).
153. Rosenblum & Forsythe, supra note 16, at 25.
154. See Note, supra note 111, at 2021, 2033 (arguing that "courts should evaluate physi-
cian-assisted suicide cases under the doctrinal framework that courts have established for
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ognized that "the issue is not whether, but when, for how long, and at
what cost to the individual [a] life may be briefly extended." 155
The distinction between assisting suicide and permitting an illness to
fatally progress is becoming more blurred as medical technology ad-
vances.15 6 Even doctors reason that "Il]ogically and emotionally, we
cannot intervene at one phase and then be inactive at another, more pain-
ful phase. We cannot modify nature and then plead that nature must be
allowed to run its unhindered course."15 7 If a physician withdraws or
withholds treatment, the inevitable result of which is the patient's death,
the physician is assisting in the patient's death. Instead of dying with a
physician's aid, however, the terminally ill patient who is not dependent
on some treatment must suffer through a painful death resulting from the
illness. Unfortunately, "the ways diseases kill people are far more cruel
than the way physicians kill patients when performing euthanasia or as-
sisting in suicide."1581 One author notes:
if society is willing to allow a terminally ill person to gasp away her life
for an hour after a respirator is removed, why not permit her death
through a doctor['s] ... administration of a lethal drug dosage? If,
under certain circumstances, suicide can be viewed as permissible and
even sympathetic, then surely speedy, humane methods for committing
the act should be permissible. 159
Assisted suicide is the next logical step in granting patients the right of
self-determination. Assisted suicide legislation would allow patients to
end their lives peacefully, instead of suffering through what may be a
slow and painful death.
Those who oppose physician-assisted suicide argue that states have a
valid interest in protecting all human life. 60 However, many others be-
lieve that when a person is so ill that "his or her life is without quality,
purpose, or contribution and instead is filled with anxiety and pain,"161
this state interest is diminished. 162 At least one court has recognized
there is more to life than mere "corporeal existence."' 163 Some commen-
right-to-die cases-that is, to balance the patient's interest in autonomy against the competing
state interest at stake in each particular case").
155. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass.
1977).
156. Garbesi, supra note 13, at 104.
157. Kenneth L. Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mercy Killing and the Good Death, 259 JAMA
2140, 2141 (1988).
158. Margaret P. Battin, Euthanasia: The Way We Do It, The Way They Do It, 6 J. PAIN
& SYMPTOM MGMT. 298, 303 (1991).
159. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 368.
160. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647.
161. McCoy, supra note 135, at 484.
162. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664 ("[Ihe State's interest [in the preservation of life] weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as ... the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes
a point when the individual's rights overcome the State's interest.").
163. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986).
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tators argue that other important qualities of life include "autonomy,
human dignity, intellectual capability, physical fitness, and other aspects
that contribute to personal well-being."u 64 Unfortunately, the terminally
ill patient often relinquishes these important aspects of life, not only to an
unremitting illness but also to a "therapy" that is limited to sedating pain
control and minor symptomatic relief. In effect, many patients, families,
and physicians must question if the treatment is worse than the disease.
One physician who treats AIDS and cancer patients noted that physi-
cians "can't control all of the pain. This issue is not just about pain but
about quality of life and dignity as well as control of your own
destiny." 165 Therefore, decisions about patient care must address the
mental and physical health of the individual. In Bouvia, the court fur-
ther articulated the need to incorporate the patient's overall well-being
into the state's interest of "preserving life" by stating:
it is [not] the policy of this State that all and every life must be pre-
served against the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not mon-
strous, for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life
that someone else must live, or more accurately, endure, for "15 to 20
years." We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State to inflict
such an ordeal upon anyone.166
Although Bouvia concerned the right to refuse medical treatment, its ra-
tionale is equally compelling in the realm of physician-assisted suicide.
The language of a recent California Supreme Court case regarding
the withdrawal of treatment could similarly apply to physician-assisted
suicide. In Thor v. Superior Court,1 67 the court held that "a competent,
informed adult has a fundamental right of self-determination to refuse or
demand the withdrawal of medical treatment of any form irrespective of
the personal consequences."1 68 The distinction between treatment with-
drawal and physician-assisted suicide blurs with the court's acknowledg-
ment that "[s]ince death is the natural conclusion of all life, the precise
moment may be less critical than the quality of time preceding it. ' ' 169
While the court recognized a state interest in the preservation of life,170 it
stated that "the state has not embraced an unqualified or undifferentiated
policy of preserving life at the expense of personal autonomy."'17 ' It also
reasoned that the state's interest in the prevention of suicide is "a limited
interest at best since it imposes no criminal or civil sanction for inten-
164. Rosenblum & Forsythe, supra note 16, at 20.
165. Diane M. Gianelli, California Initiative Would Legalize Doctor-Assisted Euthanasia,
AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 2, 1992, at 39.
166. Bouvia, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Compton, J., concurring) (extending the majority's
analysis of the right to refuse medical treatment to include assisted suicide).
167. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
168. Id. at 378.
169. Id. at 384.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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tional acts of self-destruction."' 172 The language of Thor indicates the
California Supreme Court's willingness to emphasize personal autonomy
in health care decisions.
One judge has openly admitted his support for the right to assisted
suicide. In Bouvia, Judge Compton stated in his concurring opinion:
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own
destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right
should, in my opinion, include the ability to enlist assistance from
others, including the medical profession, in making death as painless
and quick as possible.' 73
The lesson from these cases is simple: States should not seek to preserve
human life to the exclusion of all competing interests. Instead, states
must balance the state's interest in preserving life and the patient's inter-
est in quality of life.
Even if this view were accepted, many commentators do not feel
that the courthouse is the proper forum in which to create this bal-
ance.'7 4 One court noted that "[u]nlike the Legislature, the courts are
neither equipped nor empowered to prescribe substantive or procedural
rules for all, most, or even the more common contingencies."' 75 Addi-
tionally, the court in Dr. Kevorkian's trial requested legislative action to
resolve the current debate about voluntary euthanasia. 76 It acknowl-
edged that "dying with dignity" can be condoned in certain situations,
but that "it mandates a controlled environment that can be properly and
professionally monitored by competent persons and in a manner that is
acceptable to society."' 77 The court then called upon the medical profes-
sion and the state legislature to work together to resolve the issue.178
Unfortunately, the response taken by the Michigan legislature was to
criminalize assisted suicide. 179
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide fear that if legislation is
passed, it will not be limited to the sympathetic cases of the terminally ill,
but will also be used to encourage the elderly or disabled to choose death
rather than become a burden.180 As one commentator points out, how-
172. Id. at 385.
173. Bouvia, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
174. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also
Smith, supra note 40, at 415 ("Always cognizant of their role as interpreters of the law, thus
making them reluctant to be bold, creative architects, the courts need strong and unequivocal
legislation to assist them in interpreting the law within a framework of contemporary
values.").
175. Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 67.
176. See People v. Kevorkian, No. 90-390963-AZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 5, 1991).
177. Marcinko, supra note 35, at 630-31 (quoting Kevorkian, No. 90-390963-AZ at 27).
178. Id
179. S.B. 32, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1992).
180. Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly 111 Proposed Clinical Criteria for
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1383 (1992); see also Rosenblum &
August 1993]
ever, "[T]he fear of the 'slippery slope' has accompanied every new re-
lease of knowledge, scientific or otherwise." 181 Legalization of assisted
suicide could actually reduce the likelihood of any abuse by providing
well-established safeguards. Once legalized, assisted suicide could be dis-
cussed openly between physicians and their patients to ensure that the
choice is informed and is truly voluntary. Additionally, physicians could
discuss assisted suicides with their colleagues to ensure the medical
soundness of the decision.
Another shortcoming of the slippery slope argument is that it ig-
nores the nature of the legal system, which functions to create distinc-
tions. Legislation that draws the line between proper and improper
motives, and that outlines methods of assisting suicide, would inhibit
abuses. In the present unregulated environment, the potential for abuse
is much higher and the consequences more grave.
Opponents further express their concern for abuse by comparing its
practice to that of abortion: Legalized assisted suicide, like abortion,
would become routine and would not be limited to the extreme cases.18 2
If an analogy to abortion is to be made, however, such a comparison
would surely support rather than refute the need for legalized assisted
suicide. Before Roe v. Wade, 183 women who desired an abortion were
forced either to choose a "back-alley" abortion or to find a physician who
would violate the law. Similarly, assisted suicides will continue to occur
in an unsafe and uninformed manner until they are legalized. 18 4 Further-
more, access to abortion in the pre-Roe era was typically limited to white
women with the money and resources necessary to find doctors who
would perform abortions. 85 Similarly, physician-assisted suicide is cur-
rently a "white middle-class issue."' 186 Dr. Nicolas Parkhurst Carbal-
leira, director of the Boston-based Latino Health Institute, stated, "I am
sure that there are people in my community . . . who want assistance
Forsythe, supra note 16, at 29-31 ("Another implication of a right to assisted suicide would be
its inherent tendency to encompass ...patients who are disabled or medically dependent
.... ").
181. Smith, supra note 40, at 417 (footnote omitted).
182. Rosenblum & Forsythe, supra note 16, at 27 ("If legalized, [doctor assisted suicide]
will become available, and if available, it will become ... a 'reasonable' option for anyone.").
183. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
184. See, e.g., Olszewski, supra note 53, at A5 (explaining that when an assisted suicide
failed, friends of an AIDS patient realized that he "had misunderstood the fatal dose" and
"instructed his surrogate to inject him with less of the drug than was necessary").
185. See Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices; Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 128 (1989)
(arguing that in the years before Roe v. Wade, poor and minority women were virtually pre-
cluded from obtaining safe, legal abortions while white women had access through private
hospital services).
186. Lehr, supra note 3 (quoting Professor George J. Annas of Boston University, a health
law scholar who has studied physician-assisted death).
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from a doctor in a suicide, but who don't have the same access a white
middle-class person has-and that's a shame." 18 7
The debate over the issue of assisted suicide also mirrors the emo-
tional intensity of the abortion debate. 188 It is very difficult to achieve
consensus on life and death issues because these issues involve deeply
ingrained social and religious beliefs. The problem is that "neither side
[is] able to find good arguments to persuade the other." 189 However, the
minority of people morally opposed to assisted suicide should not pre-
clude its availability as a choice.
The hundreds of people who have requested help from Dr. Kevor-
kian in the last few years represent the number of people overall who
wish to have medical assistance in ending their lives. 190 Since legislatures
have failed to provide proper channels of counseling and assistance for
those who wish to die, these people must plan their deaths without ade-
quate information or advice.191 Providing sufficient safeguards and ade-
quate guidelines would allow competent, rational people to die with
dignity, without risking the health and legal consequences of a "back-
alley" suicide.
B. Medical Opinions Regarding Physician-Assisted Suicide
A 1988 survey by the San Francisco Medical Society' 92 revealed
that most physicians believe patients should have the legal right to as-
sisted suicide. When asked whether they felt that "patients should have
the option of requesting active euthanasia when faced with an incurable
terminal illness," seventy percent responded affirmatively, twenty-three
percent negatively, and seven percent were unsure.193 Although physi-
cians seemed willing to grant patients the right to active voluntary eutha-
187. Id.
188. Some anti-abortion and religious fundamental groups vowed to fight against the legal-
ization of physician-assisted suicide. Reverend Patrick Maloney, a Presbyterian minister who
heads the Christian Defense Coalition in Washington, stated, "We were silent 20 years ago
when abortion was legalized. We are not going to be silent about assisted suicide." Castaneda,
supra note 86.
189. Id. (quoting Howard Brody, director of Michigan State University's Center for Ethics
and Humanities in the Life Sciences).
190. Suicide Doctor Assists in 10th, 11th Deaths, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 5, 1993, at A3
("(Tihere has been a flurry of requests for the doctor's help in dying before a temporary state
ban on assisted suicide takes effect March 30.").
191. Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for the Terminally Il and the Constitutional Right
to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 369 (1984) ("[Ihe potential for criminal prosecution
inhibits doctors from engaging in a free and open exchange of information about euthanasia
with their terminally ill patients.").
192. Steve Heilig, The SFMS Euthanasia Survey: Results and Analysis, S.F. MED., May
1988, at 24. The respondents represented the full range of medical specialties, with the largest
percentages coming from internists (22%) and psychiatrists (13%)). Id
193. Id.
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nasia, they were less convinced that physicians should be the ones to
carry out such requests.194 Fifty-four percent responded affirmatively,
stating physicians should carry out such requests; twenty-six percent re-
sponded negatively, eleven percent were unsure, and nine percent did not
answer.1 95 Of those that responded negatively, most seemed to fear di-
minishing the integrity of the profession or being viewed as killers.
196
Similarly, other opponents of physician-assisted suicide fear that legaliza-
tion will cause patients to lose trust in their physicians as devoted solely
to a patient's health or healing.19 7
These fears are based in part on misconceptions of the doctor-pa-
tient relationship. If physician-assisted suicide is legalized, patients will
actually place more trust in physicians because they will know that phy-
sicians have the ability to more completely respect their wishes about
health care choices.19 8 Doctors could provide their terminally ill patients
with an overall health care program. Doctors and patients would be able
to have an open and honest discourse regarding the patient's wishes. Pa-
tients desiring the most vigorous treatment plan available could request
it. Similarly, patients who want certain treatments withdrawn or with-
held could make that request. Finally, those patients who honestly feel
that there would be a point in their illness when their quality of life
would be so diminished that they would not want to continue living
could discuss the option of assisted suicide with their physician. By cre-
ating a range of acceptable treatment plans, patients would be comforted
knowing they would receive a health care program that accurately re-
flected their wishes. 199
Furthermore, legalization of assisted suicide might paradoxically
prolong the lives of competent, terminally ill patients. Such patients
would be secure in the knowledge that if they chose to have a physician-
assisted suicide, when the time came they would receive proper assist-
ance. Physician-assisted suicide would allow patients to avoid taking
premature, active steps to end their lives before the illness reached a
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. See also Rosenblum & Forsythe, supra note 16, at 25 (arguing that the role of
doctors will change from healer to killer).
197. David Orentlicher, Physician Participation in Assisted Suicide, 262 JAMA 1844, 1845
(1989).
198. The group Physicians for YES on Washington Initiative 119 reported that its mem-
bers in active practice noted no ill effects on their businesses, and had, in fact, gained new
patients seeking out doctors who supported Initiative 119. Ralph Mero, Fear Campaign Beat
the Washington Initiative, HEMLOCK Q., Jan. 1992, at 5.
199. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 386 (Cal. 1993) ("Patient autonomy and
medical ethics are not reciprocals; one does not come at the expense of the other. The latter is
a necessary component and complement of the former and should serve to enhance rather than
constrict the individual's ability to resolve a medical decision in his or her best overall inter-
est.") (emphasis in original).
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point when they would no longer have the competence or means to die
with dignity.2°
Supporters of physician-assisted suicide also argue that
"[p]hysicians are the appropriate ones [to carry out requests], as only the
physician has the judgment which includes sensitivity to prognosis, alter-
native treatment options, the emotional stability of the patient, the
sincerity of the family, and the anticipated quality of projected life."'20 1
Additionally, many doctors view assisted suicide as "the last act in a
continuum of care provided for the hopelessly ill patient. '20 2 In 1989,
ten of the twelve physician authors of a New England Journal of
Medicine article agreed that "it is not immoral for a physician to assist in
the rational suicide of a terminally ill person." 203 They described a ra-
tional suicide as one undertaken by a patient "beyond all help and not
merely suffering from a treatable depression of the sort common in peo-
ple with terminal illnesses."'2°4 They acknowledged that "[i]f there is no
treatable component to the depression and the patient's pain or suffering
is refractory to treatment, then the wish for suicide may be rational. '20 5
C. Public Opinion Regarding Physician-Assisted Suicide
Legislative proposals or initiatives on physician-assisted suicide have
been and will most likely continue to be submitted to the public for ap-
proval in the near future.20 6 Thus, the view of the general public will
largely determine whether physician-assisted suicide will be legalized.
Surveys reveal an increase in the public acceptance of physician-assisted
suicide over the years. 20 7 For example, a survey taken by the National
Opinion Research Center asked, "When a person has a disease that can-
not be cured, do you think that doctors should be allowed by law to end
the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and his family
request it?"208 In 1947, only thirty-seven percent of the respondents an-
200. See Michael White, California Campaign Off to a Good Start, HEMLOCK Q., Jan.
1992, at 2 (reasoning that Janet Adkins may not have turned to Dr. Kevorkian so quickly had
she known that it would be lawful for a physician to assist in her death).
201. Id. at 25.
202. Wanzer et al., supra note 6, at 848.
203. Id
204. Id. at 848 n.2.
205. Id.
206. In 1992, "four states introduced physician aid-in-dying bills into their legislature-
New Hampshire, Iowa, Maine, and Michigan. Each bill calls for an advance directive (signed
and witnessed) that would enable a physician to provide in one form or another, aid to a
terminally ill patient who wishes to die." Abigail Gleicher, Four New Bills Demand Physician
Assisted Dying, HEMLOCK Q., Apr. 1992, at 3. However, none of these bills were passed. See
infra note 209 and accompanying text.
207. Blendon, supra note 47, at 2659.
208. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 367 n.l 14 (citing N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 23, 1984, § 1, at 1).
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swered affirmatively, compared to sixty-three percent in 1983.209 In
1990, the Roper Poll conducted a survey that asked, "When a person has
a painful and distressing terminal disease, do you think doctors should or
should not be allowed by law to end the patient's life if there is no hope
of recovery and the patient requests it?"21° Sixty-four percent said that it
should be allowed by law, twenty-four percent said that it should not be
allowed, and thirteen percent did not know.21' A 1991 poll of the West
Coast shows an even higher rate: Sixty-eight percent favor physician as-
sisted-suicide as a legal concept. 212 Additionally, The Washington Post
reported that recent "opinion polls in Michigan have shown consistently
strong support for [the] crusade to legalize physician-assisted suicide. 213
These polls reflect growing public support for legalized physician-
assisted suicide for the terminally ill. Legislators must now confront this
issue and change the law to reflect societal changes. Assisted suicide is a
life-and-death issue. It must be given top priority on the legislative
agenda.
IV. Attempts at Legislation
In the last few years, several attempts have been made to legalize
physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients. None have yet suc-
ceeded, however, for a number of different reasons. The initial attempt
at legislation was the 1988 California Humane and Dignified Death Initi-
ative.214 This initiative required certification of a patient as competent
and her illness as terminal before she could request aid in dying. The
initiative was never put to a vote because supporters of the initiative
failed to acquire the necessary 450,000 verified signatures to get it on the
ballot.215
209. Id.
210. THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, ROPER REPORT 90-5, in HEMLOCK Q., July 1990, at 5.
The 1990 Roper Poll was "taken by the Roper Organization [of New York City] of a nation-
wide cross section of 1,978 men and women, 18 and over, interviewed in face-to-face interviews
in respondent's homes between April 21-28, 1990. Percentages are rounded to the nearest
whole percent.... Weighting has been applied to ensure that age, sex, education, and income
are represented in their proper proportions." Id.
211. Id.
212. THE ROPER POLL, THE ROPER POLL OF THE WEST COAST (1991). The Hemlock
Society commissioned the Poll in May 1991. The Roper Organization of New York City
polled 1500 people in the states of California, Oregon, and Washington. See also Associated
Press/Media General Poll, Feb. 1985 (stating that 68% of respondents believed that "people
dying of an incurable painful disease should be allowed to end their lives before the disease
runs its course"), cited in Rosenblum & Forsythe, supra note 16, at 4.
213. Walsh, supra note 77, at A3.
214. Allan Parachini, The California Humane and Dignified Death Initiative, 19 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989.
215. McCoy, supra note 135, at 440 n.8.
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In 1992, state legislatures introduced bills. legalizing physician-as-
sisted suicide in Iowa,2 16 Maine,217 Michigan,218 and New Hampshire.219
None of the bills passed. 220
A. Washington Initiative 119
In 1991, the state of Washington attempted to legalize physician-
assisted suicide by introducing Initiative 119, the Aid in Dying Act. 221
The question presented to voters was, "Shall adult patients who are in a
medically terminal condition be permitted to request and receive aid-in-
dying?" 222 Under the initiative, a patient requesting such assistance
would have to be terminally ill or have an irreversible condition that, in
the opinion of two doctors, would result in death within six months.223
The patient would also have to be conscious and mentally competent,
and would have to voluntarily request the assistance in writing at the
time it would be rendered. 224 The initiative was narrowly defeated, with
46.4 percent for the initiative and 53.6 percent against it.225
Proponents of 119 claimed that last-minute television advertise-
ments, mainly financed by the Right to Life movement and Roman Cath-
olic groups, distorted the truth about the statute and lead to its defeat.226
Others urge that Dr. Kevorkian's actions may have also contributed to
the defeat because, in the final weeks before the vote was to occur, Dr.
Kevorkian helped two women die. Many people linked Dr. Kevorkian
to the proposal and feared that he would be able to bring his "suicide
machine" to Washington if the proposal passed.227
Alternatively, Derek Humphry, founder and executive director of
the Hemlock Society, believed that the two main reasons for the defeat of
the initiative were its semantic shortcomings and lack of safeguards. 228
216. Assistance-in-Dying Act, S.P. 2066 (Iowa 1992).
217. S.P. 885, 115th Leg. (Me. 1992) (regarding the terminally ill).
218. H.R. 5415, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1992).
219. H.R. 1275, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1992).
220. The Iowa and Maine legislation died during the 1992 sessions. The Michigan Act
died in the House Committee on the Judiciary. New Hampshire's Act was sent to "interim
study," a process whereby a committee must consider the legislation, but is not required to act
on it. The New Hampshire legislation has remained in interim study, effectively killed.
221. Initiative 119 (amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010-.122.905 (1990)).
222. Derek Humphry, Why Were They Beaten in Washington?, HEMLOCK Q., Jan. 1992,
at 4.
223. Genal, A Right to Die, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 7, 1991, at 9, 14.
224. Id
225. Id. The voter turnout rate was 66%.
226. See McCoy, supra note 135, at 440 n.8; Ralph Mero, Fear Campaign Beat the Wash-
ington Initiative, HEMLOCK Q., Jan. 1992, at 5.
227. Mero, supra note 226, at 5.
228. Humphry, supra note 222, at 4.
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He argued that the law was written too broadly.229 For example, Hum-
phry noted, the campaign's reference to "aid-in-dying" could mean any-
thing from a physician's lethal injection, to prescribing drugs that a
patient could use to commit suicide, to providing moral support during a
patient's death. 230 The people who proposed the initiative intended to sit
down with representatives of the medical and legal professions after it
passed to create specific guidelines. Humphry believed that the public
was unwilling to pass a law which lacked built-in safeguards.
Washington's initiative was the first attempt to legalize physician-
assisted suicide presented to voters. Voters may have been apprehensive,
not because of misgivings about the practice of assisted suicide, but
rather because the initiative was drafted inadequately. Defeat by such a
narrow margin demonstrates that a high percentage of voters do favor
laws regarding physician-assisted suicide. Legislators need to work to-
ward developing a law that voters will accept on a theoretical and practi-
cal basis.
B. California Proposition 161
One year after the defeat of the Washington initiative, California
attempted to pass Proposition 161.231 The proposed law would have al-
lowed mentally competent adults to instruct their physicians in writing
to provide aid-in-dying upon their request when they became terminally
ill.232 "Terminal illness" was defined as an irreversible condition that
would result in death within six months in the opinion of two physicians
(including the patient's attending physician). 233 Like the Washington in-
itiative, the proposition failed by a close margin of fifty-two percent to
forty-eight percent. 234 The California initiative had more safeguards
built in than the Washington proposal. One commentator remarked:
The California Initiative differs from the Washington proposal in that
the request for aid-in-dying must be an 'enduring' request; it has spe-
cial protections for persons in skilled nursing facilities, prohibitions
against intimidation and tampering .... limitations on fees, and re-
cordkeeping requirements. 235
Despite the additional safeguards, many believe voters rejected the initia-
tive because they viewed the safeguards as insufficient. Apparently,
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Death with Dignity Act (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2525-2525.24 (West
1992)).
232. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 33 (1992) (analysis by the Legislative Analyst)
(describing Proposition 161).
233. Id.
234. Daryl Kelley, Ventura Co. Tells of Error in Vote Count, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992,
at 3A.
235. Michael White, California Campaign Off to a Good Start, HEMLOCK Q., Jan. 1992, at
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many voters who agree with the concept of physician-assisted suicide
nevertheless rejected the practical terms of the proposal. 236
Interestingly, the debate over the initiative in California had a differ-
ent tone than that in Washington. In Washington the opponents debated
on a more emotional level, addressing "the ethics of the physician-patient
relationship." 237 In contrast, one commentator noted that "the majority
of the medical voices raised in opposition to the [California] initiative
focused more on procedure, attacking the proposal's safeguards as inad-
equate. ' 238 Medical professionals complained that the proposal lacked a
specified waiting period, psychiatric evaluations, family notification, and
adequate protections against misdiagnosis. 239
Others complained that the terms in the California initiative were
vague. For example, a "terminal condition" was defined as "an incurable
or irreversible condition which will, in the opinion of two certifying phy-
sicians exercising reasonable medical judgment, result in death within six
months or less.' ' 240 Some commentators argued that the language did
not clearly state "whether a patient must exhaust all forms of mitigating
treatment before being certified as terminal. ' 241 The term "attending
physician" also proved ambiguous, despite its definition as "the physician
selected by, or assigned to, the patient who has primary responsibility for
the treatment and care of the patient." 242 As stated by one commenta-
tor, the difficulty in this definition is that "[i]n a teaching hospital, each
patient has at least three doctors assigned to him: an intern, a resident,
and a faculty member. '243 Under such circumstances, it would be un-
clear who was acting as the attending physician.
Additional complaints focused on the lack of adequate reporting
procedures. While Proposition 161 required that hospitals and health
care providers report the overall number of physician-assisted deaths to
the State Department of Health Services, it did not require reporting of
individual patient names.244 Additionally, physicians would be allowed
to report on the death certificates that the cause of death was the under-
lying disease and not a drug overdose or a lethal injection. 245 Many
found these reporting measures insufficient because they failed to create a
236. See supra text accompanying note 213.
237. Diane M. Gianelli, California Initiative Would Legalize Doctor-Assisted Euthanasia,
AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 2, 1992, at 1.
238. Id
239. Id. at 39.
240. Death with Dignity Act § 2525.2(j).
241. Diane M. Gianelli, Analysis of Initiative Highlights Concerns About Physician Liabil-
ity, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 2, 1992, at 40.
242. Death with Dignity Act § 2525.2(a).
243. Gianelli, supra note 241, at 40.
244. Id at 39.
245. Id.
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system of checks and balances to safeguard against abuses within the
system.
Others noted that patients requesting assisted suicide could refuse to
submit to a psychiatric evaluation, without which doctors might find it
"difficult to assess competency and voluntariness. '246 Some felt doctors
were "ill equipped to assess the presence and effect of depressive illness in
older patients. ' 247 Many voters were unwilling to pass an initiative that
lacked the safeguard of a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether a
patient had made a rational choice.
Finally, doctors were concerned that the initiative did not bar a pro-
fessional liability insurer from raising premiums or refusing coverage of
doctors based on whether they performed assisted suicide or euthana-
sia.248 While physicians might have been protected from criminal liabil-
ity under Proposition 161, they would still be exposed to professional
liabilities, such as medical malpractice suits and increased insurance
coverage.
These serious concerns regarding the initiative's lack of specific defi-
nitions, guidelines, and safeguards ultimately lead to its failure. To avoid
a similar fate, future legislation must provide specific guidelines that
maintain a proper balance between patient autonomy and necessary
safeguards.
C. Legislation in the Netherlands
Since physician-assisted suicide can not be legally practiced any-
where in the United States, the Netherlands provides a useful example of
a country allowing physician-assisted suicide under specific guidelines.
While assisted suicide is officially a crime in the Netherlands,249 the
Netherlands Supreme Court has established that a doctor may practice
assisted suicide in certain situations. The court's rationale for allowing
assisted suicide was that
in such situations doctors have two conflicting duties. On the one
hand, they have the duty to uphold the laws of the land (which do not
allow a doctor to kill a patient); on the other hand, doctors have a duty
to put the patient's interest first. Since doctors cannot do both... they
cannot be held criminally liable for choosing to do what a doctor's
246. Id.
247. Conwell & Caine, supra note 60, at 1101.
248. Gianelli, supra note 241, at 40.
249. "The Penal code of the Netherlands section 293 states that anyone who takes another
person's life, even at his explicit and serious request will be punished by imprisonment of at the
most 12 years or a fine.. ." M. A. M. de Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262
JAMA 3316, 3317 (1989).
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professional duty demands-namely to act in the patient's best
interests.250
After the decision, the Dutch Government Commission on Eutha-
nasia was established to create a report on assisted suicide. The Commis-
sion reached the following conclusions:
1. That active voluntary euthanasia was possible without penalty.
2. That only medical doctors, using proper medical methods which
can be verified, may assist another in dying. The execution of the deci-
sion in ending the life may not be delegated to anyone else.
3. The patient must be "in a hopeless emergency condition."
4. A written request may be relied upon if the patient is no longer
able to express her will. The request must be emphatic and serious.
5. That assisting a rational suicide should be governed by these
same rules.
6. Consultation must be made with another medical officer nomi-
nated by a government ministry.
7. In cases of irreversibly comatose patients, where continuance of
normal treatment is pointless and has terminated, and after consulta-
tion with another doctor, euthanasia should be permitted.
8. It is not considered terminating life or assisting a suicide if any
life sustaining treatment is not instituted or is stopped at a patient's
request, or if further treatment is pointless according to sound medical
judgment.
9. The body must be preserved for official examination; and no
death certificate may be issued.
10. The doctor must report the full circumstances to the public
prosecutor.
11. No one may be coerced into participating in euthanasia against
her conscience. A doctor who refuses must make information available
to the patient concerning organizations or professionals with a differ-
ent view.2 51
Despite the fact that the Commission outlined guidelines for allowing
physicians to practice assisted suicide, no movement was then made to
change the law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.252
Recently, however, the Dutch Parliament has moved to codify spe-
cific guidelines under which assisted suicide may be practiced.253 On
February 9, 1993, the lower house of parliament voted ninety-one to
forty-five to attach their guidelines for allowing physician-assisted suicide
to the 1955 "Disposal of the Dead Act. ' 254 The legislation still must be
passed by the upper house and approved by the crown, but both actions
250. Helga Kuhse, The Case for Active Voluntary Euthanasia, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 145, 146-47 (1989).
251. Wanzer et al., supra note 6, at 848.
252. Idl
253. William Drozdiak, Dutch Vote to Allow Euthanasia, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10, 1993, at
Al.
254. Dutch Liberalize Euthanasia Law, NEWSDAY, Feb. 10, 1993, at 5.
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are considered formalities. 255 Once passed, this legislation will ensure
immunity from prosecution for physicians who practice assisted suicide
as long as they follow a detailed, twenty-eight point checklist. The
checklist will require, among other things, that the patient have a termi-
nal illness, suffer from unbearable pain, and wish to die.256 The guide-
lines "stipulate that anyone other than a physician is forbidden to
perform euthanasia. ' 257 Other guidelines or "carefulness requirements"
include the stipulation that the request "be made entirely of the patient's
own free will and not under pressure from another. '258 To ensure the
decision is voluntary, the physician must confer with the patient individ-
ually. Additionally, the patient must be well-informed about her situa-
tion and all possible alternatives. Also, the patient's request must express
a "lasting longing for death" and may not be "made on impulse or based
on a temporary depression. ' 259 The patient "must experience his or her
suffering as perpetual, unbearable and hopeless. '' 26° The guidelines rec-
ognize that the criteria are somewhat subjective but focus on the physi-
cian's responsibility to reasonably conclude that the patient experiences
her suffering as unbearable. 261
The physician attending to the patient must consult at least one col-
league regarding the patient's request. Additionally, the physician must
submit a well-documented report of the entire procedure to the district
coroner's office after the death, including a history of the patient's illness,
an explanation of why euthanasia was chosen, and a description of how it
was carried out.262 The prosecutor considers the case closed so long as
"an administrative review finds that all the requirements were satisfied
and no malpractice was evident. '263 The new law is expected to go into
effect in early 1994.264
V. Proposal
State legislatures should follow the Netherlands' lead by developing
guidelines by which physicians can legally practice assisted suicide for
their terminally ill patients. Assisted suicide should only be permitted by
licensed physicians because physicians are best able to analyze the pa-
tient's physical condition and inform the patient of all possible treat-
255. Id.
256. Drozdiak, supra note 253.
257. Tamara Jones, Setting a Date for Death, L.A. TIMEs, March 14, 1993, at Al.
258. Netherlands Liberalizes Mercy Killing, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 10, 1993,
at A10.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Dutch Liberalize Euthanasia Law, supra note 254.
263. Jones, supra note 257.
264. Drozdiak, supra note 253.
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ments and options. Allowing assisted suicide only under regulated
situations will decriminalize a compassionate act while preventing abuses
such as false claims of assisted suicide. Moreover, under regulated condi-
tions patients will be able to end their suffering with the supervision of a
qualified professional and in the comfort of friends and family.
State legislatures should adopt legislation that combines the most
useful elements of the Netherlands legislation and previously proposed
American legislation. The following proposal attempts to combine these
elements, creating a cohesive procedure for physician-assisted suicide.
First, a patient request for physician-assisted suicide should be de-
nied unless the patient is diagnosed as terminally ill and that diagnosis is
confirmed by another physician of the appropriate specialty. Terminal
illness should be defined as a disease that causes the patient intolerable
suffering and from which there is no prospect for relief. Because it is
often difficult for doctors to provide an accurate prognosis regarding how
long a patient has left to live, the law should not restrict assisted suicide
to those who will die within a short period of time.265 Instead, the focus
should be on the patient's degree of suffering and quality of life. New
Hampshire's proposal serves as a guideline:
'Terminal condition' means an incurable and irreversible condition,
the end stage of a disease for which there is no known treatment which
will alter its course to death, and which, in the opinion of the attending
physician and a second physician competent in that disease category,
both of whom shall have personally examined the patient, will result in
death.266
The definition of terminal illness must require the attending physi-
cian who diagnoses the patient's illness to consult a colleague for a con-
firmation of the diagnosis. Both physicians shall certify in writing that
the patient has a terminal illness as defined by the legislation. This re-
quirement avoids possible misdiagnosis by "offer[ing] a means to confirm
the correctness of diagnosis and prognosis. '267
The legislation must require that the patient requesting the physi-
cian-assisted suicide be a competent adult.268 The Netherlands plan re-
quires the request to be voluntary and of one's own free will. If the
patient is not competent, the request cannot be said to be voluntary. If
there is a question about the competence of the patient, it should be re-
265. Cf Death with Dignity Act § 2525.2(j) (defining "terminal condition" as "an incur-
able or irreversible condition which will, in the opinion of two certifying physicians [one of
whom must be the patient's attending physician] exercising reasonable medical judgment, re-
sult in death within six months or less"); Aid in Dying Act (same).
266. H.R. 1275, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1992).
267. de Wachter, supra note 249, at 3317.
268. "One who is incompetent by whatever test... cannot commit suicide because she is
unable to form the intent prerequisite to performing a legal act." Garbesi, supra note 13, at
102 n.81.
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solved by a psychiatrist. In that situation, the psychiatrist should be re-
quired to make a written psychiatric evaluation before the request is
granted. 269 Many terminally ill patients are depressed, but have an in-
dependent, rational reason for choosing assisted suicide. If the psychia-
trist determines that depression is the sole cause for the request, then
depression management and pain control should be recommended and
pursued vigorously. However, the focus of the psychiatric evaluation
should be on the patient's quality of life. The psychiatrist should recog-
nize that different people have different levels of tolerance for suffering.
As long as the request is based on a rational decision determined by the
patient's personal assessment of her current quality of life and severity of
suffering, the psychiatrist should recommend that the request be
granted. 270
The patient's decision must be informed. As with any important
health care decision, the patient should be informed of all risks, benefits,
and possible alternatives. Some patients may no longer wish to receive
intensive treatment from the hospital, but may be willing to switch to
hospice care or home treatment. 271 If the patient still wishes to die after
being informed of all of her options, her request for assisted suicide
should be considered. A patient should not be forced to succumb to any
treatment that she feels violates her personal autonomy or results in a
loss of dignity.
The patient's request for assisted suicide must be signed and wit-
nessed. The request should be entirely of the patient's own free will.272
To ensure that the patient truly wishes to die and is not under any du-
ress, the physician should be required to discuss the request alone with
the patient.273 It is also imperative that the patient be aware that the
request may be withdrawn at any time.
After a request is confirmed by the attending physician, a second
physician in the appropriate specialty, and the psychiatrist, if necessary,
the request should be advanced to a "medical ethics committee or like
body of the health care facility. '274 The committee's function should not
be to make a substantive decision regarding the validity of the patient's
269. "Psychiatrists deal regularly with the assessment of depression and suicide, and by
training and experience they are better equipped than most to determine whether a decision to
commit suicide is colored by mental illness." Conwell & Caine, supra note 60, at 1102.
270. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 378 (Cal. 1993) ("Staff psychiatrists [who]
examined [the petitioner] ... found him depressed about his quadriplegic condition but men-
tally competent to understand and appreciate his circumstances.").
271. See Timothy Quill, Assisted Suicide Ban: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Question,
DET. FREE PRESS, April 19, 1993, at 1IA (arguing that the solution to the patient's fear of a
"high-tech death in a hospital intensive care unit" is hospice care "where treatment is devoted
to alleviating physical, psychological, social, and spiritual suffering").
272. Drozdiak, supra note 253, at A15.
273. Id.
274. H.R. 1275, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1992).
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request, but rather, to ensure that the proper procedures have been fol-
lowed. The committee must determine that all of the requirements-
terminal illness, competence, informed written consent, and a second
opinion-have been satisfied.
The committee should have from three days to a week to decide
whether to grant or refuse the patient's request. This evaluation period
strikes a balance between the requirement of a waiting period to allow
the patient to fully consider her request and the desire to avoid prolong-
ing the suffering of the patient.
If the committee reaches a consensus, that decision will be referred
to the head of the department and the director of the hospital. If there is
not a consensus, the committee will explain which part of the procedure
was not fulfilled (for example, a psychiatric evaluation had not been con-
ducted). The physician and patient should then have the opportunity to
satisfy the condition and resubmit the request for approval.
After the request has been granted and with the consent of the pa-
tient, family members should be notified of the patient's decision, but
should not be able to encourage or veto that decision. As the Court in
Cruzan stated, "[T]here is no automatic assurance that the view of close
family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's. ' 275 Thus,
the terminally ill patient should be allowed to request assisted suicide
without the consent or approval of her family just as a competent adult
may request withholding or withdrawing treatment independently.
The physician actually assisting the suicide should be the attending
physician.276 The attending physician should be the physician that is ul-
timately responsible for the patient. In a teaching hospital, patients may
have a number of people assisting in their care, including medical stu-
dents, interns, residents, and nurses. However, the licensed attending
physician with the ultimate responsibility for the patient should be the
person to handle any requests for assisted suicide. The attending physi-
cian need not be the family physician, since many people today do not
have their own family doctor. However, the attending physician must be
the physician currently responsible for the patient's care. This will ensure
that the physician who knows the most about the patient's condition will
perform the assisted suicide.277
The assistance should be performed in the least active way possible,
with the ultimate timing and method of the death exclusively within the
control of the patient. If the patient agrees to and is able to ingest an oral
275. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990).
276. If the attending physician is unable or unwilling to perform the assisted suicide, she
should be required to refer the patient to another physician in an appropriate specialty who is
willing to assist.
277. Cf Death with Dignity Act § 2525.2(a), (e) (allowing any physician "licensed by the
Medical Board of California" to be attending physician, thus failing to restrict the types of
physicians who are permitted to assist suicide);
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drug, this method should be used to effectuate the greatest amount of
patient control. This will provide added assurance that the patient fully
understands her actions and desires to end her suffering. However, for
some patients, it will be uncomfortable or even impossible to ingest the
drugs necessary to end their lives. Thus, patients should have the option
to request a lethal injection instead of medication.
Regardless of the method used for the voluntary euthanasia, there
should be at least two witnesses present-the attending physician or phy-
sician administering the drug and a medical examiner. 278 This require-
ment would help prevent potential abuses and provide qualified,
experienced physicians to monitor the procedure.
Additionally, the euthanasia should be performed within the sched-
ule of one hospital shift.279 This will enable the entire procedure to be
completed by one physician to ensure safety through continuity.
When an assisted suicide occurs, there should be accurate and de-
tailed reporting.280 The act of assisted suicide as well as the identity of
the acting physician should be written on the patient's chart.28 1 Once the
act is completed, the hospital physician should report the assisted suicide
to the coroner and the State Department of Health Services.282 So long
as all procedures were followed properly, no further investigation into
the death need ensue.
The death certificate should state that the death was caused by ac-
tive voluntary euthanasia, either listing the drug overdose or the lethal
injection. However, it should also list the underlying disease that would
have eventually caused the patient's death.
Furthermore, since physician-assisted suicide under the above
guidelines will be considered valid medical care, insurance companies
should not be allowed to discriminate against physicians or health care
organizations who engage in the practice by either increasing their insur-
ance premiums or denying them coverage. Insurance companies should
be required to act as if the patient died of the underlying disease for
purposes of the insurance plan, since generally suicides are not covered
by insurance but death by illness is. Additionally, hospital administra-
tors and other health care employers would be prohibited from denying
278. See Marcinko, supra note 8, at 633-34.
279. de Wachter, supra note 249, at 3318-19.
280. Cf. Death with Dignity Act (requiring the physician or hospital to file annual reports
regarding cases of physician-assisted suicide to the Department of Health Services, but not
requiring that they reveal the patient's identity).
281. de Wachter, supra note 249, at 3318-19.
282. Id. at 3317 ("Under current regulations, the Dutch physician, after practicing active
euthanasia, is not allowed to complete that death certificate with reference to 'natural cases.'
Either the physician or the coroner reports to the police that euthanasia has taken place. The
police, in turn, report to the district attorney [who decides] to prosecute or not to prosecute.")
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privileges or otherwise limiting the physicians' practice based on their
participation in or avoidance of physician-assisted suicide.
These requirements provide accurate reporting methods and de-
tailed procedural guidelines that would serve as a check against potential
abuses of discretion among doctors. These guidelines address many of
the problems that led to the defeat of earlier Washington and California
initiatives,283 thus providing a vehicle for voters to pass legislation that
the majority conceptually support.284
VI. Conclusion
The resolution of physician-assisted suicide rests with the legisla-
ture, not with the judiciary, press, or medical administration. Dr.
Kevorkian's tactics have focused attention on the debate over physician-
assisted suicide, but his lawless approach is not the best solution to the
problem. Other physicians are being forced to secretly break the law in
order to allow their patients to die with dignity. Some terminally ill pa-
tients try to evade the law by turning to family or friends or by attempt-
ing suicide themselves. Unfortunately, these attempts often result in
more tragic consequences: Some may fail in their attempt, resulting in
greater pain for patients and their families. In situations where the as-
sisted suicides are successful, physicians, family members, or friends may
be subject to criminal charges. Without the legalization of assisted sui-
cide and without proper guidelines and procedures for assisting in death,
terminally ill people will continue to evade the law and suffer the legal,
medical, and emotional consequences in order to seek out relief.
The legalization of physician-assisted suicide is the next logical step
in granting freedom and personal autonomy for terminally ill patients
who wish to control their lives, even if that means ending their lives.
States and legislators must confront this issue. One author noted that
without the allowance of assisted suicide, "the problem of very ill or dis-
abled persons who would rather take their own lives than eke out what
they perceive as a miserable existence does not go away-it is simply
buried. ' 285 The criminalization of assisted suicide without any excep-
tions made for the terminally ill leads to circumvention of the law.286
Patients who must face intolerable pain, diminished quality of life, and
loss of personal autonomy should be able to receive assistance that could
help them end their lives in a dignified manner. Proper guidelines would
protect against potential abuses and yet allow physician-assisted suicide
to exist as a legal and rational choice. Without such guidelines, we are
reduced to an informal "don't ask, don't tell" status quo that renders
283. See supra notes 221-248 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 207-212 and accompanying text.
285. Shaffer, supra note 19, at 369.
286. See id.
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many as unwilling prisoners of their medical condition and makes others
unjustified prisoners of the legal system.
